October
21 Update - Current Anthrax Situation
- More
envelopes are being discovered with anthrax spores.
- Government
spokespersons equivocate on whether the materials are "weapons
grade."
- Better
detection of anthrax spores appears to be taking place, but slowly.
- Congressional
office buildings have been shut down for decontamination, but the methods
for doing so have not been discussed.
- Some
other buildings that have received anthrax-containing letters remain open.
- A case
of inhalation anthrax has been diagnosed in a Washington DC postal worker
Issues that need to be addressed regarding the
bioterrorism response include the following:
- Are
the anthrax-containing envelopes an initial tease, or warning? They are a good way to disseminate
small quantities, while avoiding identification of the sender. But what may be ahead? Spores in ventilation systems? Spores at sports events or where there
are dense population concentrations?
Thousands or millions of letters containing anthrax? How will we know in time, and how will
we decontaminate ventilation systems, electronics, sports arenas, soil,
etc.?
- At the
present time, public health authorities have continued to use (primarily
cutaneous) human anthrax cases as the harbingers of anthrax
dissemination. Cutaneous
infections require many fewer spores to induce illness, compared to
inhalation anthrax. The infected
individuals are serving as the "canaries in the mineshaft" who
warn that anthrax is present. If
the extent of spore dissemination increases (higher concentrations in
ambient air from envelopes, or through other means) then the inhalation
cases will serve as the canaries, and there will be many
fatalities.
- I will
continue to harp on the need for accurate and rapid sampling of the
environment as the most important (by far) technology needed to
deal with the offensive use of anthrax.
There are likely to be many more envelopes that have already
dispersed anthrax spores, but have not been identified yet, because there
have (so far) been no cases of illness related to those envelopes, and
spores were not seen by the person(s) handling the mail. This means that anthrax spores may be
contaminating a number of environments in which they have not been
detected. We may not see cases
until small animals, children, or people with immune system impairment
become exposed in those environments.
- Only
by identifying an environment contaminated with anthrax before
illness appears are we likely to effectively treat inhalation
cases.
- Only
by identifying these environments can we remove people from the
environment and protect them from further exposure.
- It
is possible that we will not be able to do a complete clean up of
contaminated environments, for the time being. There has not been a great deal of
research into how to clean up homes and offices, for example. Gruinard Island, off the coast of
Scotland, was decontaminated 45
years after it was used as a test area for anthrax during World War
II. During those 45 years, humans
and animals were barred from the island.
Ten acres were decontaminated: this required defoliating the area,
using 200 tons of 37% formaldehyde, diluted in seawater, that was sprayed
over the area, and then additional formaldehyde was re-sprayed after deep
soil sampling revealed persistent organisms.
- What
else works to kill anthrax spores, which can remain viable for decades or
hundreds or years? Bleach, which
must be in contact with spores for at least 2 minutes. Paraformaldehyde gas, glutaraldehyde,
hydrogen peroxide and peracetic acid also work, and need to be in contact
with spores for at least as long.
But these materials can be corrosive and are not appropriate for
homes and offices, though they can be used to decontaminate most
laboratories. Spores can be
boiled; the standard recommendation has been to keep the water at a
rolling boil at least 10 minutes to kill spores of any pathogen. Steam also kills spores in from 1 to 10
minutes. In goat hair mills, the goat hair was treated at 170 degrees
Fahrenheit for 15 minutes, but many spores retained their viability after
this treatment. Moist heat works
much better than dry heat.
Fumigation can be performed with ethylene or propylene oxides, or
paraformaldehyde gas.
- I hope
you can tell from this that I do not know a completely safe and effective
way to perform decontamination.
This needs to be an area of intensive investigation now. Dr. Alibek has suggested that
methods used for decontamination in Sverdlovsk in 1979 (washing trees and
houses, and paving dirt roads), may have re-aerosolized anthrax spores,
and that this may have increased the number of cases of inhalation
anthrax.
- Dr.
Ken Alibek suggested steam ironing letters before opening, which sounds
like a good idea. Put a cloth between the iron and the letter. We need to know more about the
temperature setting and how long the iron needs to be in contact with the
letter.
- The
bottom line is that spores are odorless, tasteless, and invisible,
individually. In a worst case
scenario, up to one trillion spores (1,000,000,000,000) might be present
in one gram of material. One gram
can be contained easily within a one-ounce (28 gram) letter. It theoretically could contain a
million lethal doses, if the majority of the spores were viable, of the
right size, and dispersed easily without clumping.
- What is a lethal dose of
spores? The reason why you
may read a variety of different estimates for this number is because a)
there are no human-derived data, and b) there are a variety of factors
that impact the answer. There are
many animal experiments, and those results are surprising at times. It also depends on the virulence of the
anthrax strain used, the amount of air you inhale (during exercise, you
breathe in several times as much air as you do at rest), the % of viable
spores, the distribution of size of spores, whether the spores easily
separate from each other, and your own inherent immune system
function. Thus the number might
range from 10,000 spores to many millions. Animal tests of a sample from a letter should give us a
rough idea of how virulent the potion is, and what a lethal dose might be.
- Here
are some animal data for lethal doses (LD50) of anthrax spores by
subcutaneous injection and inhalation (from JM Barnes). This shows why there are so many
cutaneous cases, compared to inhalation cases.
Species # spores injected #
spores inhaled
Rabbit 100-1000 600,000
Guinea Pig 100-1000 370,000
Mouse
10-100
1,400,000
- Another
experiment in pigs: each of 50
pigs was fed from 10 million to 10 billion Ames strain spores (C Redmond
et al.) Only 2 of the pigs died
(4% of the total) and two others had anthrax isolated from blood, but
survived. By 21 days after feeding
the spores, the majority of pigs had developed antibodies to anthrax, indicating
that they became infected and recovered.
Humans, like pigs, are probably relatively resistant to anthrax,
compared to many other species.
- How do
we know antiserum is likely to be protective? Mice, which are notoriously hard to protect against anthrax
with vaccines, were given antiserum and then exposed to anthrax. The survival of mice given two
different antisera was 80% at two weeks post exposure for both groups,
while those given control sera had a 0% or 10% survival rate (RJ Beedham
et al).
- It
remains very important to keep one's exposure to anthrax spores to a
minimum, particularly if you work in a high risk industry, such as the
postal service, UPS, Fedex, media or politics. Although I earlier advised against gas masks, I have come to
believe there is a role for appropriate, well-fitted masks that have
demonstrated efficacy in preventing inhalation of particles of the 0.5 to
5.0 micron size. My hope
is that once environmental sensors are used widely, we will be able to
discard masks. For now, if you
feel there has been an exposure, or if you are trying to avoid exposure at
a high risk occupation, HEPA dust masks (such as 3M Corp has sold for
tuberculosis prophylaxis) may be useful. The more HEPA sheets in the mask,
the better it will filter. These masks have not been tested for anthrax or
other bioterrorism exposures, so 3M cannot market them for this
purpose. However, such masks ought
to keep out 95-99% of particles in the desired size range, and could be
used for "high risk" activities such as opening mail. Gloves would also decrease one's
exposure to spores, but must be discarded after use, or washed after use
in order to reuse them.
- Again,
let me emphasize that a variety of soaps and detergents have been tested
and were found to increase spore virulence by up to a factor
of 16. That means the spores could
be made 16 times as virulent, because soaps may make them easier to
disperse as individual particles.
For now, wash only in water first to remove spores;
you can then use soap when the spores are down the drain.
- There are many methodologies for
identifying spores in the environment.
I have collected a large number of articles on this subject, and
will discuss what looks promising, and the differences between the
methods, in a subsequent update. I
continue to believe that PCR testing, because of its sensitivity and
rapidity, should be the initial test done, with the understanding that
some false positives will result, but no anthrax exposures will be missed,
as long as sampling is adequate. I
have spoken at length to Tom O'Brien of Tetracore, in Gaithersburg,
MD. His company has some very
promising PCR and immunoassays for anthrax that can be completed in under
12 hours, and can detect as few as 100 cfu (viable spores) per milliliter
of material.
- Diagnosing
exposure in people is not that easy.
Although obtaining nasal swabs is a simple procedure to perform,
one study shows that the spores rapidly disappear from the nose after
exposure, suggesting that swabs are only likely to be positive within 24
hours of contact. Thus sensitivity
may be very low, and swabs will give you many false negative results.
- Treatment
is another question. I have
suggested that many other antibiotics are as good or better than
ciprofloxacin. Doxycycline, for
instance, will also work for plague, tularemia and brucella, and
effectiveness for all these other potential biowarfare pathogens has not
been established for cipro.
- The
duration of antibiotic treatment needed remains uncertain. It is not clear if those currently
being treated are being helped by antibiotics, or would not have become
ill anyway. Antibody titers will
tell if you successfully fought off anthrax. Although CDC Deputy Director David Fleming said that a
four-fold rise in antibody titer is needed to confirm recent anthrax
infection, this is not necessarily the case. Because anthrax is so rare, one positive antibody titer (by
ELISA) should be adequate to make the diagnosis, as long as the ELISA test
is accurate.
- A
pathologist called me today regarding an autopsy of a possible anthrax
case. Autopsies can be a problem;
in animals, when the animal is opened, spores form and are released. This could contaminate the autopsy
suite. There may be temperatures
in which this does not occur, but I don't know that for sure. I recommended instead, that blood, CSF
and mediastinal fluid be sampled for the presence of the relatively
unique-appearing gram positive fat rods of anthrax. This might save you from having to do a
whole autopsy.
- How to
protect pets? The animal vaccine
works quite well though it may require yearly boosters (there is little
data on how frequently they must be given).
- I
guess my take home message is that, unlike other pathogens, which live in
the environment for minutes to, at most, days, these spores last nearly
forever. Contamination does not
resolve with time, although if spores are kicked up inside buildings, they
may disperse to less infectious levels.
Outdoors, the spores tend to stick to the soil components and
do not easily re-aerosolize.
However, that may not be the case for indoor spore
accumulations. First
responders, affected workers, and others who may be in the vicinity of an
anthrax event should behave as if there are invisible, potentially lethal
spores everywhere: on surfaces, floors, your computer and desk, your
person, walls and ceilings. This
requires an entirely new mindset for dealing with infectious
emergencies.
Meryl Nass, MD