Politics and the Life Sciences, February 1992. pp 30-32.

Can Biological, Toxin, and Chemical Warfare be

Eliminated?

Meryl Nass Wing Memorial Hospital and University of Massachusetts, USA

Is it possible to prevent biological, chemical, and toxin warfare from occurring? The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), an international treaty banning the possession and hostile use of biologi­cal and toxin weapons, already exists; and a similar chemical weapons treaty is currently being negotiated. The older Geneva Protocol of 1925 bans the “first use” of these weapons in war. It might seem that the threat of use of these weapons of mass destruction is nearly at an end.

Unfortunately, the promise of these treaties has not been borne out by experience. Despite being prohibited, acts of chemical warfare have unequivocally taken place in recent years. Many additional allegations of biologi­cal, toxin, and chemical warfare acts have been put for­ward, but not evaluated to the satisfaction of the world community or brought to a reliable conclusion (Piller and Yamamoto, 1988; Willems, 1991).

Can the reasons for the failures of these treaties be identified, and can measures be found to resolve the uncertainties in the evaluation of allegations? I believe the answer is yes, and that Barss has fruitfully addressed an important area within this large question. The follow­ing discussion is designed to put Barss’s work into an overall framework that explores the range of measures necessary to prevent the occurrence of chemical, biologi­cal, and toxin warfare.

If the Biological Weapons Convention, the strongest treaty banning an entire class of weapons to date, is used as a model, three problem areas can be identified. The first is found in Article I, which permits possession of biological and toxin (warfare) agents for “prophylactic, protective, or other peaceful purposes.” Since this lan­guage makes intent the criterion for whether possession or use of a biological or toxin agent is in compliance with the treaty, ambiguity is built into the treaty. Thus,

nations may possess unspecified quantities of biological (warfare) agents if they report that their intent is defensive.

As an example, production of increasingly virulent organisms and toxins, which have dubious applicability to defense, has been justified in this manner (Nass, 1991). Only the addition of a protocol that would set specific requirements for the possession of microbial agents and toxins will resolve this problem.

The second weak area in the treaty is its lack of provision for verification of compliance by parties to the BWC. Because chemical and biological warfare agents can be produced using the same technology and equip­ment employed for “peaceful” purposes, a serious at­tempt to prevent their production would require detailed surveillance of the pharmaceutical, bioengin­eering, and insecticide industries, among others. It would likely also entail tracking some precursors for chemical agent production, recording which labora­tories work on certain microbial or toxin agents, record­ing the transfers of such agents, listing all high containment facilities used for work on virulent organ­isms, collecting extensive data on the uses to which these facilities are put, and inspecting facilities without ap­pointment. A number of individuals and non-govern­mental organizations have provided detailed proposals for strengthening the BWC verification regime (Mesel­son, Kaplan, and Mokulsky, 1990; Rosenberg, 1991; Geissler, 1991; Wright, 1990; Federation of American Scientists, 1991).

In 1989 Senator Cohen revealed that although Con­gress had appropriated $5 million (U.S.) a year in the Defense Authorization Bill for “a program to develop and demonstrate the technology to monitor a chemicals ban, the Office of the Secretary of Defense has been opposed to that research program,” and the research had not gone forward (U.S. Senate, 1989). The United States ambassador to the Third Review Conference of the BWC, in September 1991, specified in his opening re­marks that an expert group on verification should “study the technical feasibility of effective verification of the BW Convention ... [but should have] no mandate for drafting verification provisions” (Lehman, 1991).

Thus, the commitment of the United States, and per­haps some other nations, to treaty verification is open to question, although the majority of nations represented at the review conference were anxious to develop a veri­fication regime. In accordance with the wishes of the United States, an expert committee was set up at the review conference to study the feasibility of potential verification measures, and will report back to the parties by the end of 1993. But this committee will not contain any experts from non-governmental organizations, and it is not mandated to develop verification measures.

The third area of deficiency within the BWC is its method for the evaluation of allegations of noncom­pliance with the treaty, and its lack of a response to violations. Article VI specifies that complaints may be made by any state that is a party to the BWC, and should be lodged with the Security Council, which would then decide whether to carry Out an investigation. This limits complainants to nations who are parties to the treaty, which could prevent a complaint being lodged against a government that used these agents on its own population, unless another nation took up the cause of the aggrieved.

Another significant problem is the use of the Security Council mechanism per se for dealing with allegations, since a veto by one nation can avert investigation of a complaint (Zilinskas, 1986). Furthermore, the process by which such an investigation should be carried out is not specified. This omission has had serious consequen­ces, for the scientific evaluation of a suspect episode is technically demanding. Most investigations to date have resulted in equivocal conclusions. It is this deficiency which Barss capably addresses.

In addition, no method for funding investigations has been created. Furthermore, no sanctions for noncom­pliance are outlined within the treaty, and none have ever formally been applied. The fact that sanctions against violators have not been employed may make the use of these agents relatively more attractive. Barss touches on these areas as well.

Independent of the BWC, the UN General Assembly, in a series of resolutions during the 1980s and 1990, requested the secretary general to investigate reports of the use of chemical, biological, and toxin weapons brought by any member of the United Nations (Mesel­son, Kaplan, and Mokulsky, 1990). The Third Review Conference emphasized the role of the secretary-general, in addition to the Security Council, in carrying out investigations. Whether this will adequately strengthen the mechanism for the initiation and perfor­mance of investigations is not yet clear.

In addition to weaknesses within the BWC itself, two other issues should be considered in a discussion of the prevention of chemical, biological, and toxin warfare. First, not all nations are signatories to the treaties, and not all signatories have completed the required domestic ratification. Attention should be given to achieving full participation of all nations in these treaties.

Second, it is likely that chemical, biological, or toxin warfare agents may be used covertly, a purpose for which they are well suited. Especially in the less-developed countries, unusual outbreaks of disease may never be identified, much less carefully evaluated, if there is no adequate public health infrastructure. Development of a system for the international surveill­ance of epidemics of human, plant, and animal diseases is sorely needed. This would be designed both to detect episodes that might be due to hostile acts, and to benefit the public health of all nations. It would go a long way toward making verification of the treaties and aboli­tion of acts of biological, toxin, and chemical warfare a reality.

Ideally, the characteristics of all new epidemics would be compared with the known characteristics of the dis­ease’s natural spread, and those epidemics with highly unusual features would be subject to further investiga­tion, probably by a team sent to the area for fact-finding. Finally, all the data would undergo rigorous epidemio­logic analysis. Although instituting a system for global epidemiologic surveillance would be an extremely ambi­tious endeavor, the value of such a surveillance system to the health of the world community cannot be overestimated.

Had such a system been functioning in the 1960s and 1970s, the AIDS epidemic would have been identified much earlier, and planning could have taken place that would have significantly interrupted its spread. Wheelis (1992) and Zilinskas (1992) have independently described how such a worldwide surveillance system could be created. A limited surveillance system of this type exists within the U.S. military, which generates a probability by computer that a given epidemic may be due to biological warfare (Wiener, 1987). What is now required is a decision by the world community to cooper­ate in the establishment of worldwide epidemiologic surveillance.

In his roundtable article, Barss addresses the need for a generally accepted methodology for conducting field investigations into the alleged use of biological, toxin, or chemical agents. What has been lacking is the means to achieve a definitive proof of the origin of a suspected biological, toxin, or chemical weapon event. As Barss points out, teams that have undertaken such investiga­tions in the past have used their own individual methods, thereby subjecting their conclusions to questions of scientific validity and political neutrality.

Making investigations as uniform, complete, accur­ate, and impartial as possible is essential. Barss paints in the extensive detail required. A careful and thoughtful approach to this problem has not been published before. I differ with him only in the details. I believe that the multitude of possible agents and their effects necessi­tates an agent-specific, rather than a generic, approach when performing an investigation. This will make it more likely that all the data that are required—which can

vary enormously, depending on the agent—will be ob­tained. When the agent is unknown, the most prominent symptoms will suggest the class or classes of possible agents. Basing the data collection on the characteristics of specific potential agents will assure obtaining those data that are most crucial to establishing an epidemio­logic diagnosis.

Barss suggests that a case definition be rapidly de­veloped just prior to setting off on a fact-finding mission, and that telephone consultation take place with experts from the scene. I fear that these procedures could raise later questions of political bias. Instead, expert multi­national committees should be established now to de­velop individual methodologies for the evaluation of individual agents (or symptom complexes). Case defini­tions and investigation protocols for all known potential agents would then alr9dy exist, and the need for later consultation will be minimized. The methods used would thereby be as standardized as possible.

Although Barss focuses primarily on the collection of data, specifying the methodology to be used for data analysis is equally important. What probability of error will be acceptable, for instance, when reaching the con­clusion that a biological warfare event has taken place? This area, too, should be systematized as much as possible, with input from international experts, and must avoid any appearance of governmental intrusion.

Preventing the use of biological, toxin, and chemical weapons is a complex task, but it can be accomplished. The hardest initial steps have already been taken. If we can now pursue means to investigate treaty compliance at a number of different points, close loopholes within the treaties themselves, undertake surveillance to detect covert uses of these agents, and institute penalties for noncompliance, the world will become a much safer place.

References

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Geissler, E., ed. (1991). Strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention by Confidence Building Measures. Stockholm Inter­

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Lehman, R. (1991). “Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention Third Review Conference, statement by Ambassador Ronald F.

Lehman, II, Head of United States Delegation.” United States Mission to International Organizations. September 10, 1991.

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Wright, S., ed. (1990). Preventing a Biological Arms Race. Cam­bridge, MA: MIT Press.

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(1992). “Confronting Biological Threats to International Se­curity: A Biological Hazards Early Warning Program.” Annals of the New York Academy of Science, forthcoming.